Clientelist Politics and Development

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

A rich literature studies clientelism, including consideration of underlying mechanisms and processes; correlates and contributing factors; and political, social, and economic consequences (see, e.g., Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2018; Hicken, 2011; Mares & Young, 2016; Stokes, 2013). This session explores connections between literatures on clientelist politics and economic development from both political science and economics, with focused consideration of cross-national relationships and experience in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. Collectively, the papers speak to three (inter-connected) questions:

1) How do clientelistic politics directly affect the poor, especially the poorest of the poor? The literature has emphasized associations between clientelism and poverty. Politicians, for instance, may have strong incentives to target the poor, whose electoral choices may be more influenced by small economic incentives than those of the median voter. Can this be redistributive? Does it provide channels for the poor to exercise political influence?

2) How do clientelistic politics influence development via impact on state capacity and state-society relations? The literature has emphasized the detrimental effects of clientelism and patronage politics on bureaucratic quality and state capacity through various channels. This in turn can be expected to influence development outcomes, for instance when public resources are used to sustain clientelistic networks rather than for the public good – yet these linkages might be further developed.

3) How do clientelistic politics influence development via impact on electoral politics and policy-making by elected leaders? What is the relationship between clientelism and programmatic politics? Can – and how do – they co-exist? How do these dynamics affect national development prospects? What reforms or interventions are most likely to lead to a decline in clientelistic politics?

The panel includes four papers that consider these questions from diverse angles:

Maria Lo Bue, Kunal Sen, and Staffan Lindberg’s contribution examines the relationship between clientelism, public goods provision and governance quality using cross country panel data. Drawing from the VDEM data-base, they distinguish between three manifestations of clientelism – whether vote buying exists, whether government spending is narrow targeted to specific groups, regions or parties or intended to benefit all communities, and whether political parties offer material goods in exchange for political support to their constituents, examining the effects of each of these components of clientelism on public good provision and governance quality.

Susan Stokes’s contribution draws in particular on experience from Latin America to explore the incentives clientelist machines experience to undertake developmental and pro-poor policies; the legislative and executive behavior of such parties; and how their behavior in office contrasts with (or parallels) the behavior of non-clientelist parties. The general assumption has been that pro-poor policies are achieved when programmatic parties that favor redistributive models of development eclipse clientelist machines. Guided by this assumption, perhaps we have overlooked developmental achievements of clientelist parties.

Dilip Mookherjee and Anusha Nath’s contribution addresses the pro-poor dimension of clientelistic politics. They examine the quantitative implications of presence of political clientelism on the delivery of services to poor and vulnerable groups (e.g., landless, low caste, or female headed households) within rural West Bengal, India. To assess the pro-poor bias of clientelism, their study looks at how actual program allocations to local governments is correlated with measures of 'backwardness' of the concerned villages in their jurisdiction, and compare them with allocations that would have been generated by formulae prescribed by the state government.

Jenny Guadardo and Leonard Wantchekon’s paper speaks to the appeal of clientelistic appeals to voters in poor countries and what reforms might weaken clientelistic politics. Specifically it offers experimental evidence on the effect of town hall meetings drawing on an intervention that took place during the March 2011 elections in Benin and involved 150 randomly selected villages. In the treatment group candidates held town hall meetings where voters deliberated over their electoral platforms. The control group was exposed to the standard (clientelism style) campaign. Results suggest that town-hall meetings led to a more informed citizenry, higher electoral participation, and lower policy polarization along demographic lines, as well as a greater willingness to reject unethical behavior by politicians (vote-buying).

Overall, the session brings together a theoretically and regionally diverse set of expertise to consider the relationship between clientelism and development.
 

Sub Unit

• Division 12: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries

Individual Presentations

• Clientelism, Public Goods Provision and Governance - Kunal Sen, UNU-WIDER; Maria C. Lo Bue, UNU-WIDER; Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg

• Clientelism and Development - Susan C. Stokes, University of Chicago

• Policy Deliberation and Ethical Voting - Jenny Guardado, Georgetown University; Leonard Wantchekon, Princeton

• Programmatic Clientelism and Development Outcomes in Rural Mexico - Miguel Nino-Zarazua, United Nations University; Dragan Branimir Filipovich

Chair

• Rachel M. Gisselquist United Nations University

Discussants

• Ken Ochieng' Opalo Georgetown University

• Maria C. Lo Bue UNU-WIDER