Ethnic Demographics and Preventive Civil Conflict

• In Event: Dynamics of Insurgency

Abstract

Theories of power transition and preventive war argue that two states whose relative power is shifting should be more likely to go to war in anticipation of future change. The same logic, then, should apply to civil conflict: when one major ethnic group is rising in demographic and political power relative to another, the two should have an increased likelihood of warfare. Center-seeking conflicts should result from changes in demographic power in the central government, and separatist conflicts should result from changes in demographic power in regional governments. Yet thus far there have been no rigorous tests of these hypotheses on preventive ethnic conflict. Using worldwide data from Minorities at Risk, UCDP, and other sources, I test whether over-time demographic changes are a robust predictor of ethnic civil conflict onset and escalation. In the process, I explore several potential mechanisms and moderators of this relationship, including internal migration, changing political alignments, and representative institutions. In order to explore which causal forces explain this relationship, I examine the case of demographic change in several states of Northeast India, where migration, birth rates, and administrative borders have all changed regional demographics over time.

Author

• Kolby Hanson, Naval War College