Game in the Gray Zone: Reciprocating Strategy in Maritime Disputes with China

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security II

Abstract

China’s maritime coercion, such as island construction, Coast Guard patrolling, and naval harassment, has created increasing tension in China's near seas. As China kept these conflicts below the threshold of a shooting war, international affairs experts defined such tactics as “gray-zone” operations, suggesting these constrained provocations are asymmetric, ambiguous, and incremental in nature. These unconventional tactics cause a dilemma for states which claim the disputed waters as China does. The involved states, including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, could find it difficult to decide on responses that can deter Chinese coercive operations without escalating the confrontation into warfare. It is also challenging for the U.S. to determine whether or to what extent it should intervene in these conflicts since its interventions might either press both sides to act more cautiously or intensify the conflicts. While scholarship on the practice and characteristics of Chinese gray-zone tactics soars, studies seldom pay attention to how states’ responses impact the outcomes of these contingencies. For the states subject to these provocations, the question remains: which counterstrategy can effectively curb China’s expansion through gray-zone coercion?
This study argues that reciprocating strategy, or tit-for-tat (TFT), is effective in countering China’s gray-zone operations while avoiding escalations into warfare; also, this study suggests that U.S. interventions can improve the efficiency of TFT in achieving de-escalation in gray-zone conflicts. This study first analyzes the characteristics of Chinese gray-zone operations and demonstrates that the asymmetry and ambiguity of these tactics advance the difficulties for states to respond effectively. This study then illustrates that Robert Axelrod’s theory of reciprocity is a productive framework for the development of counterstrategies against Chinese gray-zone tactics, compared to deterrence theory that some scholars currently use for this purpose. Axelrod’s theory suggests that in the long run, TFT strategy tends to generate cooperation in repeated games between two players —which scenario is similar to the maritime disputes between two states. To test the applicability of reciprocity theory in gray-zone contingencies, this paper examines three disputes over the Senkaku Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and a Chinese oil rig’s settling close to Vietnam. In the Senkaku case, Japan’s adoption of the TFT strategy and its strong alliance with the U.S. led to de-escalation without an increase in China’s power over the administration of the islands. The Philippines’ violation of TFT strategy and the insufficient U.S. intervention resulted in China’s seizing control over Scarborough. Vietnam is not a U.S. ally, but its firm pushback against Chinese escalations brought a favorable outcome for the country. In light of these three case studies, a reciprocating strategy with the U.S. support is likely an effective counterstrategy to prevent China from seizing control over disputed waters through gray-zone operations.

Author

• Alison Sile Chen, University of California, San Diego