Explaining the Success and Failure of Term Limit Evasion Attempts

• In Event: Constitutional Reforms for Particularistic Ends in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

Term limits constitute a key check on executive power, yet many incumbents manage to manipulate or evade these constraints. In this paper, we present a new global dataset that captures all evasion attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) from 1990 to 2019. The data reveal some core insights. First, evasion attempts are very common. Globally, no fewer than one-third of the incumbents who reached the end of their prescribed term pursued some strategy to remain in office. Second, and perhaps most illuminating, none of these attempts involved ignoring the constitution outright. Instead, incumbents universally displayed nominal respect for the constitution by using constitutional rules and procedures to circumvent term limits, with about two-thirds attempting to amend the constitution. But constitutional amendment is not the only legal strategy at the would-be overstayer’s disposal---presidents have tried many methods. Most notably, a number of incumbents have relied on their courts to interpret constitutional term limits out of the constitution. Other strategies uncovered by our study include: drafting a brand-new constitution and asserting that the new constitution effectively hits the reset button on term limits, finding a faithful-agent replacement leader whom the incumbent can control after he is out of office, and delaying elections by citing some form of political instability.

We also evaluate the causes of success and failure. Notably, about one-third of incumbents who attempted to overstay were unsuccessful. Failed attempts are typically characterized by an attempt to amend the constitution that faces widespread popular resistance. We offer an explanation for why this might be the case.

Authors

• Mila Versteeg, University of Virginia

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia