Why Stealth Authoritarianism is Harder Than It Looks

• In Event: Protest, Democratization, and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

Has the global authoritarian zeitgeist promoted new and lasting authoritarian regimes? Or has the recent rise of neo-populist "strongmen" (and at least one "strongwoman") produced anti-liberal policies while maintaining electoral democracy? To clarify the issues, this paper applies the widely-accepted Schumpeterian definition of democracy: executive authority assigned "by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Although the definition has been criticized for departing from classical democratic definitions ("rule by the people"), it remains the field's standard for separating democracies from autocracies. For concerns about democratic backsliding it provides a useful threshold. Where competitive electoral struggles end, authoritarianism begins.



Fully backsliding from democracy into autocracy requires two conditions. First, the executive (including any broader ruling party or faction) must have come to power through a competitive struggle for the people's vote. Otherwise, the case is not a minimal democracy to begin with. Second, the executive must have the will and, more importantly, the capacity to suppress future electoral competition and ensure they remain in power even after losing plurality support in the electorate. Deductive reasoning and a combination of quantitative and qualitative cross-national evidence show this bid is exceedingly difficult.



The conditions that initially produced electoral democracy mean there is a viable opposition force with a vested interest, and mobilizational power, for preserving electoral competition. This group including ex-incumbent politicians and members of other "out" parties. In addition, within the ruling clique, there are likely to be national or sub-national elites whose careers depend on mobilizing constituents and avoiding an unpopular single-person or single-party dictatorship. Further, the ambitions of these "out" and "in" politicians may actually incentivize the ruler to exercise restraint. Knowing they do not enjoy a political monopoly, the ruler confronts the likely prospect of eventually leaving office and returning to the opposition. The time horizon of being in and (again) out of power offers a strong influence on executive behavior.



An array of initial evidence supports these deductive hypotheses. OLS regressions among predominant-party systems period shows that alternation in power remains likely even after the country experiences non-democratic spells, as measured by Polity IV, Freedom House, and other leading sources. Case studies of Pakistan and Sri Lanka trace how this process can unfold. Contrary to warnings about stealth authoritarianism, elected incumbents – while hardly exemplars of liberal democracy – did not indefinitely suppress electoral competition.



These findings inform the broader debate about whether the world is witnessing a "wave of autocratization" or instead experiencing a bit of "tyrannophobia." Schumpeterian elections cast a long and encouraging shadow over incumbent who seek to entrench themselves. If these patterns hold, today's neo-populists — from the rightwing Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán to the leftist Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed — are unlikely to consolidate authoritarian regimes.

Author

• Jason Brownlee, University of Texas, Austin