Hyperpresidentialism in the Southern Cone of Latin America

• In Event: Imperial Power, Executives, Origins, and Functions

Abstract

Despite the formal constitutional separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches in virtually all states throughout the world, some of these countries have experienced the phenomenon of hyperpresidentialism, where the executive branch has in practice been able to usurp power from the legislative and judicial branches. Fundamentally, my paper seeks to answer the question of why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not others. I will attribute the root causes of hyperpr esidentialism to three independent variables: 1) weak state institutions in a country, 2) the possession by the president of a strong working majority in congress, and 3) a recent history of economic crises in a country. My analysis will focus on the cases of Argentina and Chile, two countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America which despite being similar on many variables, critically differ in the extent to which they demonstrate patterns of hyperpresidentialism. Whereas Argentine heads of state have largely been able to act with relatively few institutional checks on their power, Chilean presidents have been significantly more restrained by institutions of horizontal accountability. In addition to these two case studies, my analysis also utilizes data from a large-N analysis of presidential systems throughout the world (with an emphasis on presidential democracies in the Western Hemisphere).

Author

• Dan Berbecel, York University