The Bureaucratic Origins of Preferential Access to Economic Growth.

• In Event: Business and the State in Developing Economies

Abstract

How do unequal political connections affect who becomes a bureaucrat and the decisions they make once in power? Bureaucratic discretion can critically affect private-sector development under selectively enforced rule of law, yet the political inequalities underpinning bureaucratic decision-making remain understudied. To test the impact of political inequalities on private-sector access—as moderated by bureaucrats—I implemented a survey in Senegal that reached 770 agencies that business owners in Senegal visit as part of their operations. Preliminary results show that politically connected bureaucrats grant politically connected firms preferential access to the tools necessary for economic growth. These results contribute to the evidence base suggesting the political obstacles facing entrepreneurs in environments with weak rule of law.

Author

• Abhit Bhandari, Temple University