Political Friendship, Enmity, and the Burdens of Atonement

• In Event: Poster Session: Foundations of Political Theory I

Abstract

The political friendship literature argues that interpersonal trust among citizens can be generated, and the strains on democracy produced by encounters of difference and disagreement, counteracted, when citizens interpret politics and their social relations in terms or friendship (variously defined). The thought is that even if citizens are largely strangers, a culture of trust can emerge when citizens largely view one another as potential or likely friends, rather than as potential or likely enemies. Even if we grant this argument, however, the question remains: how ought a political theory which takes political friendship seriously consider those who find themselves outside the circle of political friendship – in particular, those who cannot be considered potential or likely friends, but rather must be considered enemies?

This paper begins to answer this question by placing the political friendship literature in conversation with theories which emphasize political enmity. I first consider Carl Schmitt’s argument that political friendship, identity, and meaning are only possible when juxtaposed against an existential threat. I argue that Schmitt, problematically, is moved to this extreme conclusion because his analysis is too binary: it uses extreme circumstances to define the normal, equating possible enemies with necessary enemies, and thus obscures the possibility that people can, to varying degrees, be both potential friends and potential enemies.

I then consider Steven Johnston’s more plausible theory of tragic democratic agonism. According to Johnston, democracy is defined by agonizing dilemmas whose resolutions, however necessary, often require political violence. So, Johnston argues that we should adopt a “tragic ethos” whereby we recognize that democracy must act (often violently) yet commit ourselves to atone for the harm done by those actions – however necessary those actions might be. From this tragic ethos emerges a multifaceted approach to the question of enemies. Political identity is indeed structured by difference, yet constant hostility does not necessarily follow. We can practice “Sophoclean agonism”, doing harm when necessary but never without a sense of tragedy and responsibility (to atone) – until we cannot: we must practice fugitive antagonism against fundamentalists who threaten the democratic order (e.g., neo-Nazis). Unlike Schmitt, who consider enemies to be, paradoxically, both existential threats and existential necessities, Johnston thus treats enemies as occasions for self-overcoming.

I demonstrate that Johnston’s perspective, while ultimately insufficient on its own terms, offers important insights that a political theory which takes friendship seriously ought to consider. I critique Johnston’s perspective on two fronts. First, I reject his implicit critique of political friendship, that it relies on certain resources like patriotism which inhibit citizens’ abilities to adopt the tragic ethos and discourage them from taking responsibility for the violence democracy employs on its own citizes. Appealing to Ajume Wingo’s notion of political veils, I demonstrate that patriotism does not necessarily “romanticize”; it can not only cultivate a sense of unity, but also help citizens identify instances harm or ill – injustices, however necessary, that must be addressed. Second, I argue that the distinction Johnston draws (following Chantal Mouffe) between Sophoclean agonism and fugitive antagonism cannot be upheld by the tragic ethos alone. Even if citizens do recognize the tragic dimensions of democratic politics, there are different sorts of competitive pressures that encourage citizens to consider one another antagonistically, rather than agonistically with presumptive generosity – as fundamentalists. As a result, without something like political friendship, the expression of difference is in danger of assuming a Schmittian flavour rather than a tragic one: enemies are in danger of being seen as existential threats, not occasions for democratic self-overcoming, and the sacrifices imposed on citizens, of becoming romanticized and increasingly severe.

Still, this perspective does provide important insights. Johnston encourages us to recognize the need to atone for incurred debts of necessity and to become worthy of the violence democracy employs, even if we ultimately want citizens to trust one another more than they would in agonistic circumstances. It also encourages us to recognize the potential need to practice fugitive antagonism. A tension, however, emerges: particularly when there are many potential fundamentalists, the actions required to combat fundamentalism will impose tremendous sacrifices on citizens, thereby making it more and more difficult for citizens to atone for incurred debts of necessity and to view one another as potential or likely friends, rather than potential or likely enemies.

Author

• Eric Cheng, Waseda University