Only Best People: Loyalty, Competence, and Connections in Russian Elite Networks

• In Event: Subnational Officials and Subnational Development in Contemporary Russia

Abstract

Autocratic leaders face a well-known tradeoff between the loyalty and the competence of their subordinates (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Zakharov 2016). However, personal connections between those subordinates can also comprise a threat to loyalty to the dictator. In this paper, I develop a theory that incorporates personal connections into the loyalty-competence dilemma. I show that regime members who have high levels of competence and good connections are very threatening to loyalty, as they can more easily coordinate against the dictator, are well-informed, and may serve gatekeeping roles. Regime members who are connected but have lower levels of competence are, in contrast, easily co-opted into the regime and are unable to select winners in a rebellion. I test this theory using comprehensive social network data on all Russian federal-level political elites from 2000-2012. Incorporating measures of competence and network centrality into panel regressions and temporal ERGM social network analysis, I demonstrate the risks and rewards that personal connections can generate in autocracies. These findings contribute to literatures on coup-proofing and the roles of institutions in autocratic survival and authoritarian power-sharing (Svolik 2012).

Author

• Noah Buckley, Higher School of Economics; Trinity College Dublin