The Organizational Dynamics of Military-Militant Alliances

• In Event: Poster Session: Conflict Processes I

Abstract

Governments frequently provide support to foreign militants, but we know little about why governments provide different types of support to different militant groups. Existing literature largely conceptualizes state-militant cooperation as one-sided, under-the-table provision of weapons to opportunistic rebels. While this is sometimes the case, governments and foreign militants frequently engage in partnerships considerably more costly in terms of time and trust: state armed forces form joint commands and conduct joint attacks with foreign militants and provide them with advanced missile systems. Similarly, foreign militants often provide their government partners with intelligence, access to their military infrastructure, and deploy elite units to supplement their state partner’s troops. Why do governments and foreign militants provide more costly forms of support to some partners but not others? Drawing from organizational sociology and military scholarship, I argue that, when foreign militant groups and state armed forces have similar standard operating procedures and chains of command, they provide each other costlier and more intense forms of support like conducting joint operations and providing advanced missile systems. Because particular standard operating procedures and chains of command produce stable but idiosyncratic patterns of behavior, partners that share these characteristics mutually understand and believe they can predict how their partner will act in response to unexpected shifts in conflict dynamics. This reduces uncertainty about whether their partner will pursue similar objectives and adhere to agreed-upon commitments. When dissimilar on these characteristics, partners provide less intense support like money and logistical aid. To test my theoretical predictions, I analyze a novel data set of over 150 Syrian militant groups that received some type of U.S. support. I supplement this analysis with an in-depth comparative case study that juxtaposes the CIA’s and the Department of Defense’s provision of support of select Syrian militant brigades. My case study draws on over 60 interviews conducted with U.S. and Jordanian officials and Syrian militants.

Author

• Melissa Anne Carlson, University of California, Berkeley