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While many studies have demonstrated the varying effects of direct external support during civil conflict, very few have yet to examine the more indirect methods of participation by outside actors, and even fewer have extended these implications to nonviolent resistance in particular. However, one of the key foreign policy tools states have for influencing the outcome of resistance campaigns or civil conflicts are what I call “negative support” tools (e.g. embassy or foreign aid withdrawal, condemnation, or sanctions). These forms of negative support aren't necessarily directed towards nonviolent resistance groups, but rather, are imposed to influence the behavior of target governments. These more indirect methods have not been explored in the context of aiding nonviolent resistance campaigns, despite their potential efficacy for keeping target governments from engaging in violent repression. In this paper I utilize a new dataset I’ve collected on external support to nonviolent resistance groups to examine two related questions: 1) Are foreign states more likely to utilize “negative support” tools against target governments that violently repress nonviolent resistance? And 2) Does “negative support” increase the likelihood of nonviolent resistance success when compared with more direct forms of external support? I argue that the relationship between these two questions lies in the ability of external actors to constrain target government repression during nonviolent resistance, thereby increasing the chance for negotiated settlements with nonviolent resistance groups.