Waffling, Ambiguity, and Coalition Building

• In Event: Coalition Building in the U.S. Congress

Abstract

This paper is an exploration of strategic waffling and dissembling by U.S. House members during the internal coalition building process on major bills. The focus is trade legislation considered by the chamber during the 1990s and early 2000s. The evidence is mostly archival – drawn from internal whip polls conducted by party leaders, analogous head counts completed by the White House, less formal tallies of member positions compiled by coalition leaders attempting to defeat the relevant legislation, and systematic information about member preferences gathered by leading interest groups lobbying for and against these measures. Importantly, the emergent policy positions articulated by members during the coalition building process often differ substantially across these multiple and often competing audiences. The key questions addressed by this paper are when and why lawmakers engage in such strategic behavior and the consequences for coalition leadership and the explanation of Washington activity.

Author

• C. Lawrence Evans, College of William & Mary