How Resource Rents and Electoral Institutions Shape Political Party Systems

• In Event: Parties, Party Systems and Partisanship in Latin America

Abstract

This paper considers how changes in natural resource rents have affected democratic governance in Latin America by analyzing their impact on the region’s political party systems. Contemporary resource curse theories emphasize the role of rent quantity and volatility in bringing about negative regime outcomes, noting that the effects of rents are conditional on institutional quality. However, they pay little attention to the interaction between specific institutions and resource rents. This paper argues that the effect of resource rents on political party systems is conditional on the electoral systems in place: in plurality systems, higher rents increase coordination, while in proportional systems, they increase fragmentation. It also argues that governments can re-design institutions in an effort to shape the coordinating/fragmenting effects of rents, undermining democratic governance and accountability. For its empirical analysis, the paper relies on a nested, mixed methods research design. It begins with the quantitative analysis of panel data covering all legislative elections across the region, finding a robust interaction effect of rents and electoral systems on the effective number of political parties. It then relies on case studies of Brazil, Ecuador and Peru to trace the causal processes by which resource rents and electoral institutions jointly shape, and often undermine, political party systems and democratic governance.

Author

• Luis Felipe Mantilla, University of South Florida St Petersburg