I'll Be Back: Exiled Leaders and Political Instability

• In Event: Leaders and Civil Conflict

Abstract

Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. For instance, scholars have noted how questions of justice inevitably arise whenever an abusive ruler decamps for a foreign safe haven. This paper takes the debate on the merits of exile in a new direction by investigating a different—and arguably even more fundamental—issue with golden parachutes: Do exiled leaders create problems for peace and stability back in their home countries? We argue that exiled rulers can increase political conflict in their home states via two mechanisms. First, exiled leaders may return to their home countries—typically at the head of a rebel army—to challenge the incumbent regime. For example, Uganda’s Milton Obote was ousted in 1971 and fled to neighboring Tanzania. During his exile there, Obote created an armed opposition group that returned to Uganda in 1979 to fight and ultimately overthrow the sitting regime. Second, short of actually returning, leaders in exile can destabilize their home state's politics from the outside in a variety of ways. Indeed, exiled leaders frequently provide support to opposition groups in their home states that seek to undermine the incumbent government. By way of example, exiled leaders such as Charles Taylor and Idi Amin have been accused of funneling money and weapons to anti-government militias in their home states. Other exiled rulers, such as Ferdinand Marcos and Juan Peron, have attempted to foment coups from abroad. Thus, our main empirical prediction is that exiled leaders are associated with an increased risk of political instability in their home states. To test our argument, we introduce the Leaders in Exile dataset, an original source of information on the fates and behavior of rulers who fled abroad upon their ouster. We then replicate published articles examining three different types of instability—civil wars, coups, and protests—with our new exile data incorporated into the models. We find compelling evidence that exiled leaders increase political violence and regime instability in their home countries. We conclude with a discussion of how golden parachutes create an intertemporal trade-off. In the short-term, exile may be a useful tool for facilitating conflict termination and regime change since it gives troubled rulers a better option than fighting it out at home. But in the long run, leaders in exile often create problems for their home states. This trade-off, of course, raises policy implications: If exile is both a short-term solution and a long-term problem, it is a good idea to offer golden parachutes to embattled rulers? We propose a strategy of conditionality that might mitigate some of the problems associated with exile. In particular, host states should be prepared to withdraw the welcome mat if exiled leaders interfere in the politics of their home countries.

Authors

• Daniel Krcmaric, Northwestern University

• Abel Escriba-Folch, Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals