The Exit Dilemma: Providing Golden Parachutes to Embattled Dictators

• In Event: Leaders and Civil Conflict

Abstract

Leaders in trouble of domestic overthrow, and foreign governments who prefer that these leaders go into exile, face a series of credible commitment dilemmas. Leaders may worry that promises of immunity from prosecution for rights abuses will not be honored in the future (especially since the advent of the International Criminal Court). Foreign governments worry that leaders will merely pocket offers of exile and double down on efforts to stay in power, confident that safe exile, once offered, is a fallback option. In addition, both leaders and those offering them exile worry that the other party may expose the offer of exile as a means of creating political pressure. We explore these dilemmas with a formal model and analysis of two case studies: the efforts to get Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega and later Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to accept offers of exile. We conclude with brief application to ongoing efforts to remove Venezuelan President Maduro from power.

Authors

• Andrew Bennett, Georgetown University

• Ariya Hagh, Georgetown University

• Zacchary Ritter, Gallup