Humanitarian's Dilemma

• In Event: Formal Models of International Conflict

Abstract

Does forceful intervention in the name of protecting civilians actually improve citizens' welfare? We develop a model where an autocrat faces a threat of being ousted by a domestic opposition, which is reduced by repression. By repressing internal threats, the autocrat suppresses internal instability. A third party may engage in humanitarian intervention in response to high levels of repression by an autocratic regime. Both repression and instability are detrimental to citizens' welfare, particularly instability that may result from a regime change. Potential outside interveners, who seek to halt harm to citizens caused by repression, face a dilemma: humanitarian intervention may immediately stop repression but introduce instability that is detrimental to civilians. This dilemma is particularly acute in cases where humanitarian intervention has either a secondary aim, or unintended consequence, of imposing regime change. We show that if humanitarian intervention is exclusively contingent on repression, intervention increases the likelihood of political instability, leading to further harm to civilians. However, if intervention threats are independent of repression, but intervention is more likely when the regime is challenged, then both the incentive to repress and the likelihood of civilians suffering political instability decrease. Interventions in the face of coup threats are humanitarian.

Authors

• Livio Di Lonardo, Bocconi University

• Jessica Sun, Emory University

• Scott Tyson, University of Rochester