Choosing Challengers: The Economy, Policy Drift, and the Cost of Ruling

• In Event: New Developments in Economic Voting Research

Abstract

When it comes to the economy and elections, a large body of evidence finds that poor economies are costly for political incumbents. But if economic decline turns them away from the incumbent, where do the voters go? How do voters choose among challengers? In this paper, we advance a general theory of retrospective voting and apply it to the choice between three governing party types: sitting incumbents, established alternatives, and inexperienced alternatives. We argue that voters choose in two stages. The first stage is a referendum on the incumbent party, which voters judge in terms of its record as manager of the economy. The choice among challengers enters at stage two, and is informed by policy alternatives. When the cost of ruling is high, voters are more likely to revert to an established party option, even in the face of economic decline. We test the argument with an analysis of individual data from 60 post-election surveys and an examination of vote shares from 223 elections in 18 advanced democracies from the 1970s to present.

Authors

• Timothy Hellwig, Indiana University, Bloomington

• Tonya Kenny Dodez, Indiana University