Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations and the Two Presidencies

• In Event: Legitimacy and the Presidency

Abstract

The “two presidencies” thesis states that the president is more influential relative to Congress in foreign policy than in domestic policy. In this paper, we subject this thesis to a new empirical test based on presidential influence on congressional appropriations. It rests on a key premise: Presidential power is manifested through an asymmetry in presidential influence on appropriations outcomes where presidents’ proposals of large spending changes shape outcomes more strongly than do proposals of incremental changes. On this basis, we examine the extent to which this asymmetry is systematically more pronounced in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Our analysis draws on the most systematic, granular, and comprehensive multi-agency line-item data on congressional appropriations in existing research, linked to signals of presidential emphasis such as Statements of Administration Policy.

Authors

• Huchen Liu, Princeton University

• Lee Dionne, University of Mount Union