A Theory of Top-Down Democratization: Wars, Taxation, and Parliaments

• In Event: Entering and Leaving Democracy

Abstract

Motivated by research on the relationship among wars, taxation, and parliaments in early modern Europe, we develop a new theory of top-down democratization. A ruler decides whether to call parliament, which guarantees public good provision; and a representative elite chooses to fund the government, refuse, or flee. These decisions affect the likelihood of exogenous external takeover. We partially recover the conventional bellicose logic: a strong war threat increases the ruler's willingness to trade parliamentary constraints for revenues. However, we also highlight various indirect strategic effects of war threats that undermine the conventional bellicose logic. Strong threats decrease elite demand for parliament by increasing a non-constrained government's willingness to provide public goods and by undercutting the elite's leverage to refuse to fund the government. Strong threats can also break the state by causing the elite to flee regardless of whether the ruler calls parliament. Overall, the relationship between external threats and equilibrium parliament is complex and nuanced---not a simple matter of greater threats encouraging state-building.

Authors

• Brenton Kenkel, Vanderbilt University

• Jack Paine, University of Rochester