State Legislators, Their Staffers and Representation of the American Public

• In Event: Agents In the Politics Industry

Abstract

Previous research has indicated that political elites have, at best, a murky understanding of their constituents’ policy preferences. Where does this lack of accuracy come from, and what explains variation in these misperceptions across individual lawmakers and legislatures? Using an original survey of state lawmakers and their staffers, we examine likely contributors to legislators’ misperceptions, including their staff. Given results from our previous research, we pay close attention to how interest groups and respondents own preferences skew how legislators and their staffers perceive constituents. We test our hypotheses using observational data, a list experiment, as well as a series of experimental vignettes fielded on survey respondents. Our preliminary findings shed light on the role of legislative staff in the policymaking process, interest group influence in American politics, and processes of democratic representation across the U.S. states.

Authors

• Matto Mildenberger, University of California Santa Barbara

• Leah Stokes, UCSB

• Alexander Warren Hertel-Fernandez, Columbia University