Deterrence and the Structure of Nuclear Forces

• In Event: Nuclear Forces, Strategy, and Deterrence

Abstract

Nuclear weapons are said to deter through the threat of a punishing retaliatory “second strike.” To do so, a sufficient portion of a nation’s nuclear capabilities must survive initial enemy attack. Diversifying a nation’s arsenal of nuclear delivery platforms is “deterrence dominant” in that it increases the survivability of nuclear forces without adding to the destructiveness of a first strike. By contrast, increasing the number of warheads per delivery platform augments the offense without improving deterrence. Other attributes of nuclear force structure, such as the presence of ballistic missile submarines or the nuclear “triad,” have weaker or varying effects on deterrence, since they benefit both the first and second strike. We test our core arguments using data on nuclear force structures and conventional disputes between nuclear states. Our findings suggest several ways to improve future nuclear stability, with important implications for ongoing policy debates on nuclear modernization, disarmament, and arms control more broadly.

Authors

• Erik Gartzke, UCSD

• Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska-Lincoln