Buying Prestige? Status Motivations and Foreign Aid Allocation

• In Event: The Politics of Foreign Aid

Abstract

What drives donor behavior in foreign aid allocation? Previous studies explain the varying behaviors through categorizing aid donors into groups, such as Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, non-DAC donors, and rogue donors. While these categorizations provide insight on specific aspects of the aid donation there remains a gap in the understanding of the general pattern of aid donation. This study introduces status inconsistency as a determinant of aid allocation and puts forth a theoretical framework that explains aid allocation across all types of donor states. Employing network analysis concepts (e.g. network centrality scores), we extend the literature on aid donation and suggest that the likelihood of providing aid is conditional on states’ placement within the international system – which can be characterized by status in/consistency. Status is a state’s position in the international system. Two types of status achieved status, which describes the position of a state based on achievements. The second is ascribed status, which is the position given to a state by other states. States are status inconsistent (SI) when the two statuses are incongruent, that is, when one status is higher than the other. A state is characterized as negative SI when the state’s achieved status is greater than ascribed status. And, a state is positive SI when its ascribed status is greater than its achieved status. The two types of SI possess varying effects on state behavior, including incentives to engage in aid donation.

We suggest that negative SI states, those states that have greater achieved status than ascribed status, are more likely to provide aid than positive SI states – those with greater achieved status than ascribed status. Negative SI prevents states from achieving their foreign policy goals because of the conflict and uncertainty between the two different levels of status. Negative SI states will strive to gain the respect and reputation that is commensurate with their achievements.

States want to assuage or avoid negative SI. Foreign aid allocation may be used as a cost-effective tool to alleviate negative SI because donors receive reputational and prestige benefits. We find initial support for our expectations. Negative SI states donate more aid than status consistent and positive SI states. Additionally, the findings also suggest that states may select foreign aid recipients, based in part, on the recipients’ ability to provide reputational and prestige benefits. States with motives to buy prestige give foreign aid to more central and more important than those recipients that are less visible in the international system.

Authors

• Aaron Shreve, Randolph College

• Tracy Kuo Lin, University of California, San Francisco