Islands of Stability: Evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia

• In Event: Conflict, Cooperation and Statebuilding in Fragile Countries

Abstract

Under what conditions do "islands of stability" emerge in countries with failing central governments? This paper proposes an innovative theory to explain variation in subnational security provision in fragile states and tests it empirically. Refining the mechanism underlying Mancur Olson’s typology of stationary and roving bandits, the theory posits that the presence of rulers who are locally bounded by their ethnic identity positively affects local security. Locally bounded rulers hail from a major local group that is a national minority. Their identity’s local appeal thus does not extend to the national level, which bounds their political ambitions within a given region. As a result, they govern with a long time horizon and enter into cooperative contracts with their population: rulers guarantee protection in return for information and support for the regional government. Examples include Afghanistan's Balkh Province, Iraq’s Kurdistan region and Somaliland. To test systematically whether the tenures of locally bounded governors are associated with less violence, the study uses an extensive, original dataset on the governors of 56 provinces/regions in Afghanistan, Iraq and northern Somalia from 2001-2018. By taking a new, disaggregated look at subnational security dynamics, this project advances the debate on how ethnicity affects local governance and statebuilding in fragile countries.

Author

• Michael F. Harsch, National Defense University