How States Maintain Cooperation by Building New International Organizations

• In Event: The Political Economy of Security: People, Firms, States and Institutions

Abstract

How do International Organizations (IOs) react to challenges? I argue that members states of IOs respond to demands for change by creating linked IOs, which are semi-autonomous organizations embedded within the governing structure of existing, traditional IOs. Linked IOs provide a politically viable means through which member states can recontract the terms of their cooperation. They provide an outlet to periodically redistribute the benefits of cooperation when updating the core features of an IO are infeasible. To test my argument, I analyze the emergence of 1,200 linked IOs between 1945 and 2014. Statistical analyses show that linked IOs are created when changes in the membership environment disrupt the equilibrium balance of costs and benefits at a traditional IO. I supplement the quantitative analysis with a case study of the World Bank Group. The analysis shows that changes in the power and interests of members generated disagreements over Bank priorities, which led to the creation the International Development Agency (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). My theory offers a unique perspective on how countries adapt IOs to changing global circumstances and has broad implications for the durability of the global order in an increasingly multipolar world.

Author

• Andrew David Lugg, University of Maryland