Safeguarding the UN: Why Member States Create New UN Bodies.

• In Event: The Politics of Institutional Choice

Abstract

The United Nations (UN) is a lightning rod for criticism. Yet, despite constant charges of ineffectiveness and bias, the UN has grown into a network of hundreds of organizations. Why do states continue to create new UN bodies? I argue that the process follows a distinct political logic, which I call organizational safeguarding. The costs associated with exiting or building a viable substitute is too costly for most states. Therefore, when states become dissatisfied with the UN they instead propose and build new linked organizations to better reflect their preferences. To test the argument I collect data on approximately 400 UN affiliated bodies created between 1945 and 2018. Empirical analyses demonstrate that increasing dissatisfaction within the UN – measured by General Assembly voting and text analyses of UN General Debate speeches – leads to an increase in the creation rate of linked organizations. Furthermore, the effect is magnified when powerful states are among those most dissatisfied. The results suggest that the UN system is better able to withstand shifts in the power and preferences of states than many commentators fear. At the same time, the creation of new linked bodies increases organizational complexity, which can lead to further criticism.

Author

• Andrew David Lugg, University of Maryland