External Threats and Democratization from Military Rule: Burma and South Korea

• In Event: Militaries and the Public: Representativeness, Trust, and Intervention

Abstract

The paper presents a novel theory of democratization from military rule, arguing that sustained external threats facilitate democratization by credibly assuring the armed forces in power of continued influence and resources after it has “returned to the barracks.” As a test of the theory of credible assurance, it utilizes the ``most-similar systems design" in a comparative case study of military regimes in Burma (1962-88) and South Korea (1961-87). In short, the paper contends the threat from North Korea that South Korea faced and the lack of such an outside threat in Burma help explain why South Korea peacefully democratized while Burma did not in the late 1980s.

A key reason that autocratic regimes engage in violence is that a regime considering handing over power cannot be sure that it will have its interests (or the terms of an agreement) preserved in the post-transition world. However, for military regimes, sustained external threats facilitate non-violent transitions by providing credible assurances of continued influence out of power. The source of this credibility stems from: 1) the military’s monopoly on the means for protecting the country and 2) the joint interest of all parties – including the incoming regime – in a robust national defense against the external threat. The shadow of conflict, in other words, ameliorates the commitment problem for militaries in power.

The paper first outlines the similarities in the political developments of each country as well as the circumstances each military regime faced during the 1987 and 1988 political crises. This will provide historical context and exclude the similarities as causes behind South Korean democratization and the continuation of military rule in Burma. It then details the implications of the theory for 1) how long the duration of the crisis lasts, 2) the nature of the negotiations between the regime and the democratic activists and the concessions made by the regime, as well as 3) the position of key opposition political leaders during the process.

Testing the implications against the historical record, the paper shows that for all three, the process of South Korea peacefully democratizing and Burma not being able to do so all support the logic of credible assurance. Lastly, it discusses how recent developments in Burma further support the rationale of credible assurance at work before concluding.

Author

• Joonbum Bae