Governing Public Spaces: Institutional Structures and Interest Groups

• In Event: Democratic Participation in Cities

Abstract

Over the last several years, American democratic institutions have been challenged again and again with new political tactics, many of which undermine public deliberation. However, times of contentious politics and polarization, as now, often produce increased political participation. Preceding this current political climate is increased recognition of the political power within the urban environment. Sanctuary cities have demonstrated that the success of federal government policies are very often contingent upon the cooperation of urban governments and the street-level bureaucrats that they employ. Global trade networks connecting urban centers to centers of production have given increased control of the economy to cities. The more we examine urban politics, the more evident it becomes that many of the political ideals that we are contending for- democracy, equality, liberty, and pluralism, for example, depend increasingly on the conditions of urban governance. Urban spaces are a critical context for political deliberation and popular claims to government institutions and access to policy-making processes.

This paper is focused on the institutions that govern public spaces in the City of Chicago and the interest groups that organize around them. The goal is to identify the institutional variables that influence interest group behavior, such as access points and democratic oversight, and whether these variables enhance or diminish interest group activity. After providing an analysis of city-wide institutions and interest-group behavior, I look closely at the Chicago Park District, its policies, its partnerships, and its conflicts. The findings indicate that the registered lobbying activity reported to the city is only one part of a larger picture of urban interest group influence. This one institution alone has access through the mayor’s electoral power, direct lobbying, public hearings, legal obstructions, and project partnerships and gifts. There is interest group activity evidenced in each of these points and seems to support the conclusion that interest groups form where individual citizens do not have the legal or political agency to accomplish their interests alone. While the CPD allows citizens to communicate their preferences, it is not bound to respond to them in their policy decisions. Thus, when citizens seek to access the policy arena, they often form groups from which to apply collective pressure. The result is a vibrant domain of political competition over the urban spaces that set the stage for much more far-reaching deliberations.

Author

• Rebecca J Clendenen, University of Illinois in Chicago