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In elections in authoritarian regimes, do voters reward politicians when the government does a better job serving their needs? Do regimes answer to signals sent by voters by choosing which candidates to nominate? We study the case of the Cuban National Assembly, where the number of candidates equals the number of seats in multi-member districts. Voters can vote for some or all of the candidates in their districts, thereby having some choice and options to express their preferences to the government. We look at the 2018 elections, and to answer our first question we study how National Assembly incumbent delegates up for reelection perform in them depending on how their districts fared after hurricane Irma in 2017. We also study whether voters reward or punish the government in general instead of their delegates to the National Assembly. To estimate the impact of the hurricane and the subsequent speed of recovery we use nighttime luminosity data. To address the second question, we look at re-nomination and reelection rates in 2018, based on delegates’ vote share in the 2013 elections and the effect of the hurricane. Finally, we compare the Cuban case with the effect of Irma on elections in a democracy, such as the 2018 gubernatorial elections in Florida, United States.