Buy Votes, Bye Trust: Political Corruption and Voter Turnout in China

• In Event: Elections Under Autocracy

Abstract

Voter turnout is a significant indicator of political participation in both democracies and autocracies, and corruption’s impact on turnout is under long-term debate. Previous literature has addressed three major theories: the distrust argument, trade theory, and the removal hypothesis. However, the empirical analysis of corruption’s impact on turnout is limited, especially for authoritarian regimes. Though several researchers discuss the cross-national impact of corruption perception on turnout, they do not evaluate the effect of actual corrupt activities. Based on village-level elections in China, this research responds to the gaps in the literature by focusing on how corruption perception, previous experience of corruption, and electoral corruption impact turnout of competitive elections in autocracies. Via adopting hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) and mediation analysis, this paper, with evidence from the China Survey 2008 dataset, suggests that first, citizen perception of corruption tends to decrease turnout through a low interest in elections, as a response against the removal theory. Second, both corruption perception and experience with corruption can decrease turnout, moderated by greater concern about democracy in China. This mechanism reveals that these corruption variables influence turnout through dwindling trust in the regime. Third, activities of electoral corruption increase turnout directly, which gives credit to the vote-buying theory. Overall, although corruption can directly “buy” votes, it may undermine voting by decreasing political trust in both elections and the regime.

Author

• Chengyu Fu, Harvard University