Responses to Energy, Cyber and Peacebuilding Threats: Lessons from NATO and EU

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

When do international organizations (IOs) adapt in their response to important modern threats and when do they fail to do so? This paper is a part of a larger project which studies the organizational response of regional IOs with overlapping competencies such as the European Union (EU) and NATO to modern or “emerging” threats. Drawing from the institutional adaptability theory (Wallander, 2000), the project identifies policies and practices that make a notable difference toward IOs’ successful adaptation as opposed to policies and practices that constrain organizational adaptation, thus leading to these institutions’ destabilization in the long run. Our previous works introduced a model that explains efficacy of organizational response based on the variation of institutional assets and organizational decision-making (D-M). We identified four “ideal” categories of organizational response to varying threats – “efficient response,” “muddle through,” “stop-and-go” response and “organizational ineptitude.” In this paper we study how changing conditions such as the acquisition of new assets and the modification of D-M alter organizational response over time.
This study focuses on three areas of conflict and security where NATO and the EU have overlapping competencies – peacebuilding, energy security and cybersecurity. Our preliminary works identifies several distinct effects that has facilitated help bolster response and help avert organizational destabilization. First, the endowment and the ownership effects confirm that both the ownership and the allocation of greater resources tends to improve response as expected. Second, the militarization effect shows that, in some instances, it can improve the efficacy organizational response (e.g. the NATO’s response to cyber threats), while on others it can have an effect of undermining or delaying organizational response (e.g. NATO’s handing of energy security). Third, the structural reorganization effect shows that IOs can improve their response by modifying existing structures through reorganization of existing hierarchies or deepening of organizational expertise. Fourth, appropriate problem identification and solution effects confirm that the identification of the correct problem and its appropriate solution can be critical for the efficacy of IO response as shown by NATO and EU mission and operations in the former the Yugoslavia (esp. Operation Althea in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo) and in Africa (such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the EUCAP Missions in Mali and Niger). Finally, we have also identified several side effects related to issues of international legitimization. Based on the observed effects, the paper suggests offers policy recommendations how to bolster NATO and the EU’s institutional adaptability in areas of critical “emerging” threats. These recommendations suggest a broader strategy how to use institutional adaptability as a tool to improve IO response during times of major challenges for global governance and for international organizations’ raison d’être.

Author

• Ivan Dinev Ivanov, University of Cincinnati