The Geo-Political Effects of COVID-19

• In Event: Relevance, Quality, and Expedience: Political Science Responds to COVID-19: COVID-19 in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This essay focuses on evaluating the geopolitical effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the key conflicts in contemporary world politics. The paper argues that this crisis is likely to aggravate the four major conflicts of the 21st century: great-power competition; the authoritarian challenge to the democracies: the dispute between liberals and populists inside the democracies; and the conflicts in failed states and their de-stabilizing effects on the West. Overall, the second decade of this century has witnessed the growing effects of these domestic and international conflicts. On the international level, observers have noted the rising great power competition, led by the rivalry between the West and Russia, and even more so, between the US and China. Joining the geopolitical component of the rising great power rivalry is an ideological competition between the democratic versus the authoritarian model. This dimension was strengthened following the 2008 financial crisis in the West, while China argued that its “state capitalism” was more effective than the Western liberal free market model. Inside the democratic world, a rising conflict emerged between liberals and nationalist-populists with regard to economic globalization, immigration, the checks and balances on elected officials, and the partly related role of the so-called “deep state” (which in the populist view includes the professional civil service, experts, academics, the mainstream media, and the judiciary). Especially in recent years, the nationalist-populist camp has scored unprecedented accomplishments, with the UK’s exit (Brexit) from the European Union (EU), the election of Donald Trump, the rise of far-right parties in Europe, and elections results in Brazil and India. At the same time, following the Arab Spring, failed states flourished in the Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Libya), as well as in other regions as a result of state collapse (Somalia, Afghanistan, and quite a few others). The rise of the failed states led to growing migration and terrorism, which, in turn, affected the rise of populism in the West through the growing opposition to migration and the rising fear of terrorism—both processes manipulated by nationalist-populists to accumulate political power and to challenge liberal democracy.
In liberal eyes, the outbreak of the coronavirus seems to justify the liberal arguments about the global and trans-national nature of threats to all of humankind. Such threats should compel large-scale international cooperation among states and the construction of powerful international institutions. At the same time, the paper examines the argument that the post-coronavirus world might be less liberal and pursue less international cooperation—even if it is not fully rational in light of the need for greater international cooperation in order to cope effectively with epidemics. At this stage, it looks as though authoritarianism, nationalism, and unilateralism have accumulated some advantages and that this outcome will aggravate the struggles inside and among states and also great-power competition, notably the rivalry between China and the US. The COVID-19 crisis led many states to focus on their own problems without caring to pursue international cooperation. Such self-help dynamics took place even among the members of the most far-reaching cooperative international institution: The EU. Numerous states, including even some democracies, applied new and powerful methods of state surveillance and of tracing their own citizens, thus potentially creating the means for challenging privacy and individual freedom even after the COVID-19 crisis ends. Finally, the paper analyzes the concern that the crisis will especially hit hard weak and failed states. This might provide opportunities for radical forces to de-stabilize their regions and beyond. All of this will also create pressures for mass migration which might further challenge Western democracies. At the same time, the incompetence shown by populist leaders in addressing the epidemics—at least partly because of their contempt for expertise and for “liberal elites”/” the deep state -- might weaken their appeal and provide new opportunities for liberals to challenge them. The handling of the COVID-19 will also have major effects on the attractiveness or “soft power” of the democratic versus the authoritarian model. Each model can claim for superior capacity: free flow of information (democracies) vs. social control of the population (authoritarians). The paper evaluates the relative effectiveness of the two models’ performance based on the record of authoritarians vs. democracies during the crisis. In sum, the paper carefully examines the key geo-political effects of the major crisis brought about by COVID-19.

Author

• Benjamin Miller, University of Haifa