Voluntary Costly Signaling in Religious Communities: a Political Interpretation

• In Event: Evolutionary Approaches to Politics

Abstract

Costly signaling theory of religion has been proposed to explain evolutionary adaptiveness of religion in general and, more specifically, its prosocial effects. Adapted from evolutionary biology, it proposes that, by engaging in risky, burdensome or otherwise costly behavior individuals signal their commitment to the group, which allows the group to eliminate free-riders, enhances mutual trust and facilitates effective cooperation. In the religious context, costly signals are hard-to-fake signs of commitment beyond simple profession of faith, such as engaging in time-consuming rituals, celibacy, behavioral restrictions etc. (Irons 2001)
It has been assumed in the literature that costly signals are costly requirements or restrictions – behaviors demanded from the members, imposed on them or forbidden by the community (e.g. Sosis and Bressler 2003). But is this assumption valid? Can’t costly signals be voluntary? A member might, on their own initiative, engage in behaviors that would, by the standards of the group, be regarded as both costly and valuable/desirable, but are not absolutely required. The function of such behavior might be to display an above-average level of a trait, such as commitment. However, such voluntary displays may also increase a member’s status within the group, help assert their authority and thus be empowering. Religious communities from virtually all cultures, from North America to Asia, and of all types (communes, monasteries) have adopted various forms of voluntary sacrifices, including self-inflicted pain, body markers, fasts, sleep deprivation, seclusion and other forms of ascesis. Leadership or elite position is often associated with extra commitment, as evidenced by groups as diverse as the Medieval Cathars, Indian Jainists and the Hare Krishna sect, where adopting a more demanding lifestyle elevates a member to a privileged position.
Voluntary signaling might be: (i) low-cost in the sense of Szamado 2011, i.e. entail mainly efficacy costs, as in displays such as possession trance, prophesying, receiving spiritual gifts and other forms of marking the privileged access to the supernatural sphere; or (ii) costly, entailing strategic (fitness) costs, i.e. be Voluntary Costly Signals (VCS) proper. Compelling examples of the former (low-cost) type of voluntary empowering, manipulative signaling are succession contests in some religious communities, such as “the battle of gifts” between Joseph Meacham and two other challengers for Shaker leadership over the grave of James Whittaker (Potz 2012, 393–394) or the charismatic duel between Brigham Young and Sidney Rigdon during the 1844 Mormon succession crisis – where the exaggerated displays of spiritual possession had largely tipped the scales of the community’s support in favor of the more suggestive pretenders.
An extreme example of the latter, voluntary costly signaling (VCS) is provided by 19th century Russian and Ukrainian religious dissidents inspired by the Skoptsy whose leaders, unlike the majority of members, practiced castration (Zhuk 2004, 102). According to the political interpretation proposed here, castration was a VCS enhancing the member’s prestige and elevating him to a position of power, precisely because it was non-obligatory, costly and meaningfully anchored in the group’s doctrine. The same might be true for other non-obligatory permanent body markers.
Using cross-cultural evidence, the paper develops this political interpretation of religious voluntary signaling, exploring the relative value of required v. voluntary signals, their costliness (efficacy and strategic costs they entail), their expressions in various cultural contexts (VCS, while not required or expected of a particular individual, take a culturally approved and meaningful form, using the culture’s symbolic repertoire) and their effectiveness as empowering mechanisms. Under this interpretation, religious signals are not just requirements imposed by the group to reinforce the ideological and normative consensus. For some members, they are voluntary transmitters of religion-based (theocratic) legitimation of power, their bids for status and authority.


Irons, W. (2001), “Religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment”, in: R. Nesse, ed. Evolution and the capacity for commitment. Russell Sage Foundation, 292–309.
Potz, M. (2012), “Legitimation Mechanisms as Third-dimension Power Practices: The Case of the Shakers”, Journal of Political Power, 5(3), 377–409.
Sosis, R. and E. R. Bressler (2003). “Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion”, Cross-Cultural Research, 37(2), 211–239.
Számadó S. (2011), “The cost of honesty and the fallacy of the handicap principle”, Animal Behaviour, 81, 3–10.
Zhuk S. (2004), Russia’s Lost Reformation. Peasants, Millennialism and Radical Sects in Southern Russia and Ukraine, 1830–1917, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP.

Author

• Maciej Potz, University of Lodz