Hard to Say I’m Sorry: Domestic Reactions to Making International Apologies

• In Event: Leader-Based Approaches to International Conflict

Abstract

Research in psychology shows that interpersonal apologies mend fences between aggrieved parties. Interestingly, however, research in political science on international apologies—apologies from one state to another—raises doubt about whether such apologies facilitate state-to-state reconciliation. Why do international apologies appear to have little beneficial effect on reconciliation between states? In this paper, we argue that a key problem with international apologies is that senders’ incentives in terms of when and how to apologize are often incompatible with recipients’ expectations. Apologies should have the greatest potential to improve the relationship between the sender and target when the relationship between the two is strained. Yet, it is exactly under these circumstances that the leader of the sender state might find it most difficult to gain domestic support for issuing an apology, and the leader will be hesitant to risk either public backlash that undermines the conciliatory signal of the apology or an electoral penalty. Furthermore, apologies should be most likely to lead to reconciliation when the sender takes responsibility for the harm done; these apologies will be perceived as sincere. We hypothesize that leaders in the sender state face incentives instead to offer qualified apologies that provide a justification for the action or to offer mere statements of sympathy that evade the question of responsibility. We test these hypotheses in a survey experiment. Our research points to an important incommensurability underlying the demand and supply of international apologies and also provides insight into the contextual and wording factors that shape the potential for domestic backlash.

Authors

• Michaela Mattes, UC-Berkeley

• Jessica L. P. Weeks, University of Wisconsin-Madison