The Political Economy of Oversight: Prosecutors and Corruption in Brazil

• In Event: Challenging Paradigms in the Study of Bureaucracy

Abstract

Prosecutors play a critical role in justice systems around the world. While much has been written about prosecutor discretion and accountability in the area of criminal justice, little is known about their role in the fight against political corruption. How do prosecutors use their discretion when seeking to control corruption? How do bureaucratic insulation, norms, and resources shape prosecutorial strategies? What consequences do prosecutors’ strategies have on corruption, political competition, and public service delivery? To address these questions, I study the case of Brazilian state prosecutors – an extraordinarily Weberian anti-corruption agency that combines high levels of autonomy, discretion, and capacity. First, I document variation in prosecutor strategies with administrative data. Second, I document variation in prosecutors’ anti-corruption norms and strategies using an original survey of prosecutors. Third, I identify the effect of prosecutors’ work on corruption, political competition, and public service delivery. To do so, I exploit variation in prosecutor presence across municipalities. Third, I complement quantitative findings with qualitative insights from in-depth interviews with prosecutors and politicians.

Author

• Guillermo Toral, Vanderbilt University