Oligarchs and Legislative Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine

• In Event: Innovative Approaches to European Legislative Processes

Abstract

One of the defining features of many post-Soviet political systems is the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a few (Hale 2014). Post-communist Ukraine is no different. There is significant literature on the political influence of oligarchs in post-Soviet Ukraine (e.g., Aslund 2014; Khmelo and Bonnal 2020; Pleines 2008, 2009, 2016; Way 2005). One of the interesting findings of this research is that oligarchs often served in key legislative and executive positions. Markus and Charnysh (2017) find that 58 percent of oligarchs in their data served directly in government.

Building on this observation, this paper seeks to go further by trying to understand better the behavior of these oligarchs in the Ukrainian legislature, the Supreme Rada. Using network analysis and data on oligarchs and their legislative behavior from 1998-2018, we will reveal the pattern of support among oligarch legislatures. The preliminary analysis reveals important patterns of regional and party support that adds to our understanding of how wealth and power interact to influence legislative decision making in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Authors

• Frank C. Thames, Texas Tech University

• Stephen Bloom, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

• Diana Butsko