Behavioral Foundations of Presidential Accountability

• In Event: Politics of the Unilateral Presidency

Abstract

Presidents possess vast authority over policies and outcomes. Recent studies suggest the public checks presidential unilateralism through expressive opinions and political participation. We ex- amine this accountability link by formalizing its logic and examining its basis empirically. The theoretical conditions under which the public poses an effective check on unilateral power require stringent assumptions. A pre-registered panel survey prior to the 2020 presidential election demonstrates that presidents pay no net cost for acting, and may even benefit. Though respondents penalized presidents for failing to achieve their goals, a comprehensive examination of unilateral actions from 1993-2018 reveals that most action receives asymmetric media coverage. News stories provide positive coverage and assign credit for actions at their announcement, with rare follow-up on realized outcomes. On balance, our theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that unilateral presidential action is a credit-claiming device that is most often unrestrained by public opinion.

Authors

• Kenneth Lowande, University of Michigan

• Benjamin Goehring, University of Michigan