Anger and Political Conflict Dynamics

• In Event: Emotions, Beliefs, and Political Behavior in Pluralistic Societies

Abstract

Passions run high in politics. From protest mobilization, to crisis diplomacy, to political violence and war, emotions such as fear and anger can play a prominent role in shaping attitudes and structuring behavior. However, formal strategic models of politics typically do not account for the ways in which emotions can alter preferences, shape information processing, and, as a result, affect equilibrium outcomes. Rather, these models emphasize the strategic context of decision-making, using standard rational choice assumptions regarding actors’ preferences and processing abilities. Likewise, behavioral researchers have historically relied on empirical research to map associations between emotional states and political outcomes, rather than explicitly theorizing how rational choice assumptions should be modified to account for emotions' role in politics. In this article, we aim to address this gap, developing a formal model that explicitly integrates behavioral assumptions regarding the role that anger plays in shaping actor preferences, learning, and actions. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic psychological game of conflict in which beliefs about prior actions lead to angry emotional states which can cause preferences for uncooperative behavior. We show that two parties who initially have dominant strategies to cooperate may reach permanently non-cooperative states as a result of self-reinforcing anger cascades. These findings demonstrate the role that anger can play in shaping adversarial interactions, locking adversaries into cycles of retaliation that prevent learning and, as such, become difficult to break.

Authors

• Keith E. Schnakenberg, Washington University

• Carly Nicole Wayne, Washington University in St. Louis