Faction, Anti-Corruption, and the Consolidation of Xi Jinping’s Power in China

• In Event: Managing Power and Crises in Xi Jinping's China (Pre-Recorded)

Abstract

China has undergone an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign targeting not only low-level “flies” but also many high-ranking “tigers.” Prompted by the Chinese Communist Party’s weakened discipline over its corrupt members and a secular decline in the country’s economic momentum, this campaign represents a structural break from the normal politics of leadership transition, factional power balancing, and anti-corruption efforts in China. We develop a game-theoretic model to explain the new power dynamics of factional and coalition politics in the Xi era. More specifically, we examine the new factional basis for persecution under the anti-corruption campaign and assess the extent to which Xi Jinping’s allies are being strategically promoted into positions, especially those vacated by anti-corruption prosecutions. In concluding, we show that while the power consolidation of the Xi Jinping era is unprecedented since the time of Mao, the anti-corruption and promotion processes may have bear more complicated and nuanced implications for Chinese elite politics in the years to come.

Authors

• Rongbin Han, University of Georgia

• Robert Grafstein, University of Georgia

• John Wagner Givens, Kennesaw State University