The Limit of Decentralized Data Collection: Experimental Evidence from Colombia

• In Event: Challenging Paradigms in the Study of Bureaucracy

Abstract

A core function of states is the collection of information. Much of the data that central governments compile originates from data requests to decentralized entities. Responding to these requests represents a regular task of decentralized bureaucracies. Despite the fact that the resultant data are often used to allocate resources or enforcement from the central to local governments, we know little about how national governments induce compliance with data requests and the resultant incentives for local bureaucrats to accurately report data. We study the production of Colombia's annual transparency index at national scale through an experiment in collaboration with the Colombian Office of the Inspector Attorney General. We randomize whether decentralized government entities receive direct or delegated instruction from the Inspector Attorney General's office. We further adopt a factorial design randomizing the content of these communications to study bureaucratic dynamics within decentralized entities and the oversight functions of the national government. We measure compliance with the request for data, the quality of responses, the accuracy of responses, and the effort exerted by decentralized bureaucrats in filling out the matrix. We contextualize this data collection effort using a survey of all public entities in Colombia and interviews with policymakers that authorize data collection.

Authors

• Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, European University Institute

• Tara L Slough, New York University