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How do theoretical presumptions condition grand strategic preferences? What effect do these conditions have on the practical applicability grand strategy? How might advances in middle-range international relations theory inform more actionable grand strategy? We argue that conceptualizing grand strategies as derivatives of grand international relations theory cultivates three blind spots. First, conceptions of national interest may be unduly limited, overlooking their construction across various times, cultures, societies, and political structures. Second, some threats to those interests may be assumed away, detaching scholarly efforts from the real pressures facing policymakers. This inhibits comprehensively considering tradeoffs associated with addressing some threats and not others. Third, various tools of statecraft may be overlooked or their means of application underappreciated. All three blind spots undermine academics' ability to inform policymakers and feed division between the halls of power and the ivory tower. Rather than theoretically parsimonious grand strategy, we advocate a pluralist approaches that draw on rich sets of middle-range theory. Such theory helps operationalize interests, relate threats to interests, and proscribe courses of action with specific tools of statecraft. This approach avoids presuming how the world works and how it might be affected by governments and instead embraces flexible, tailored grand strategies.