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This paper recaptures a conceptual space in the famous commerce and virtue debates that is germane to our thinking about the moral possibilities of liberal modernity. Montesquieu is a pivotal figure in these debates, whose theoretical assessment of modern commerce loomed large in the political thought of his Scottish contemporaries. More broadly, he represents an important axis point in the history of political thought, in being one of the first thinkers to predict and theoretically respond to the eventuality of market society. Even though Montesquieu was an enthusiastic booster of commerce, he warned that our attachment to liberty will weaken as commercial mores come to dominate our psychological dispositions. The paper emphasizes Montesquieu’s moderate response to this problem, which avoids the clash between a liberalism of self-interest and a republicanism of selfless civic virtue. He accepts the possibility of multiple intermediate positions between fully embracing a classical republican or a commercially grounded vision of politics. That is, one does not need to jump directly from Athens or Rome to the Mandevillean beehive. The first part of the paper examines the precise dynamics of such a reconciliation through the lenses of Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam Smith, emphasizing their shared propensity for social distinctions, which constituted a principal motor capable of producing honor in a society increasingly preoccupied with commerce.
The next part compares Montesquieu’s and his Scottish counterparts’ understandings of modern liberty to provide a more textured account of how their notions of honor cascade and integrate differently in their political arguments. First, I examine how Montesquieu traces the origins of modern liberty in France to Saint Louis’ judicial reforms. Then, I examine how Hume and Smith trace the origins of modern liberty in Britain to Henry VII’s property reforms. Here, readers will discern how their preoccupation with economic, legal and cultural history, reflects a sensitivity to the fragility of liberty and order in the modern world. The discussion then returns to how their historically-grounded theories of politics accommodate virtue within a pluralistic commercial society. I argue that Montesquieu, Hume, and Smith shared the view that the means by which to balance the pursuit of wealth and the public good is a rare nexus between the desire for honor through wealth and public acclaim. However, they reject the agon that characterized pre-modern honor-loving cultures. As such, they each aimed to pacify honor by channeling it within the commercial world.