Who Recognizes? U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy and the Conferral of Legitimacy

• In Event: Shifting Nuclear Balance

Abstract

The need for social recognition shapes many contemporary conflicts in global politics. China’s challenge to U.S. military and economic hegemony represents efforts to be recognized as a great power. Though the markers of great power status are typically material—e.g., aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons—recognition does not always follow from material achievements. How is recognition conferred and whose recognition matters? This paper explores the unique position of the U.S. in conferring recognition and legitimacy through nuclear diplomacy. Military and economic challenges may ultimately undermine U.S. power but the power to recognize and legitimate remains tied to the U.S.’s hegemonic influence.

This paper explores two distinct case studies of nuclear diplomacy in which U.S. recognition played a pivotal role in negotiations—the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement (hereafter the “123 Agreement”) and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Though structurally very different kinds of nuclear accords, both deals constitute key shifts in the perceived legitimacy of India and Iran, respectively. Material benefits for both India and Iran undoubtedly played a role but symbolic recognition was key to the success of the agreements. In the midst of negotiations, the U.S. publicly recognized India as “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” with all the rights that such recognition would entail. And while the JCPOA did not carry the same kind of explicit recognition, it did legitimate Iran’s pursuit of particular nuclear technologies. This paper analyzes public statements and private memoirs of negotiators to explore the unique practices of recognition in U.S. diplomacy.

Existing literature on recognition in international politics typically focuses on formal legal recognition of sovereign statehood. Here recognition is conferred through international law and international institutions. But much of the politics of recognition occurs informally through tacit understandings and is not limited to questions of legal sovereignty. The practice of social recognition ultimately entails a contest over the kind of actor a particular state represents. Of course, all states have differing perceptions of one another—despite the assumptions of U.S. policymakers Iran is not universally seen as a rogue state. Nonetheless, U.S. recognition carries more weight, a fact that even its adversaries begrudgingly accept. This paper explores these informal practices of recognition through the specific context of nuclear diplomacy but should be of interest to scholars beyond the nuclear proliferation niche.

This paper analyzes the politics of social recognition displayed in these diplomatic junctures and considers consequences for the future of U.S. hegemony. Has the U.S.’s role as conferrer of recognition and legitimacy changed given the Trump administration’s retreat from global governance? Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, due in part to the kind of recognition the nuclear deal seemed to entail—even a deal that could technically limit Iran’s capabilities was seen as a form of legitimation. The U.S.’s withdrawal has had a destabilizing effect on the deal, despite the continued support of the other P5. But even the withdrawal ultimately demonstrates the power of the U.S.’s capacity to recognize. Only the U.S. can confer and take away recognition with major consequences for global politics.

Still, this dynamic may be changing, particularly as developing states look to states like China and Russia for global leadership. To be sure, developing states have a long history of engaging with China and Russia, particularly when it comes to nuclear technology. But have competing great powers supplanted the U.S.’s role as conferrer of recognition and legitimacy? This paper explores these future prospects.

Author

• Sidra Hamidi, Stetson University