Rentier Individuals: Political Consequences of Alaska Native Cash Transfers

• In Event: Cash Transfers and Subsidies in Developing Democracies and Indigenous States (Recorded)

Abstract

How does unearned income affect political behavior? A deep scholarship exists on earned income and political participation, yet little is known about the effects of unearned income---money that individuals receive regularly and unconditionally from non-employment sources, such as government-paid universal cash transfers. This paper proposes a novel theory rooted in political psychology and the logic of the “rentier” state: large, repeated cash transfers to individuals foster political quiescence by removing interests and incentives to participate. Greater personal prosperity from these windfalls reduces economic and particularistic demands on government, severing a basic accountability linkage between state and citizen. Unlike earned income, these repeated transfers carry few co-benefits of higher wealth that would typically increase political engagement, such as education, family networks, and civic skills. In the absence of issue-specific reasons for engagement or threats to continued flow of unearned income, transfer-receiving individuals will be less likely to participate in politics. The argument is tested with original survey and administrative data on lifetime political participation among Alaska Natives who, based solely on date of birth and tribal affiliation, receive either quarterly dividend checks since birth or no dividends until bequeathed by family death. The study bears theoretical implications for civic engagement and the perils of unearned income at the individual level.

Author

• Paasha Mahdavi, University of California, Santa Barbara