Congressional Responses to Presidents' Unilateral Actions in Defense Policy

• In Event: Politics of the Unilateral Presidency

Abstract

By focusing on defense-related bills, we explore congressional sensitivity to presidential unilateralism as a “most difficult case.” Defense is by far the most common issue area to generate policy objections from presidents. It is also an issue area, like foreign affairs, in which Congress traditionally gives the president a large measure of discretion. As such, we studied congressional reaction to unilateralism in signing statements in a policy area in which the president is expected to dominate. In this “most difficult case,” we find that Congress still responds with increased oversight to the president’s disaggregation of policy. The Senate’s greater attention to oversight (as compared to the House’s) fits with standard presentations of defense policymaking.

Our empirical tests employ cross-sectional time series, allowing us to cover three presidencies (1997-2016) while controlling for congressional committee and policy areas. Our data drawn from presidential signing statements is quite granular. Rather than using a signing statement as a measure on its own, we assessed each signing statement and counted and categorized objections within them. Our hypothesis is that Congress responds to objections within signing statements, rather than signing statements in a general sense.

As data is released, we'll add the Trump years.

Authors

• Scott H. Ainsworth, University of Georgia

• Brian M. Harward, Allegheny College

• Ken Moffett, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville