Electoral Systems, Competition, and Incentives for Corruption

• In Event: Accountability, Crisis and Excuse-Making

Abstract

What is the effect of electoral rules and electoral competition on political corruption? While the influence of electoral systems on accountability and representation has been widely studied, research on the link between electoral systems and corruption remains sparse. This paper develops a model for the interplay between corruption and electoral rules by considering incentives for challengers to run anti-corruption campaigns against incumbents. I identify two major components: First, rules that increase competition create incentives for free-riding as challengers prefer that other challengers run anti-corruption campaigns. Second, larger district sizes create coordination problems as one incumbent may be overexposed while others may not be exposed at all. These characteristics, produced by a mixture of high competitiveness and proportional representation, is the worst system in regard to corruption. I show that these predictions hold empirically by using quasi-experimental data from Brazilian municipalities. This study has implications for the design of electoral institutions.

Author

• Umberto Mignozzetti, Emory University