Interest Representation in Mexico City's Informal Markets

• In Event: Comparative Urban Politics

Abstract

In this paper, I explore a dimension of organizational dynamics in the informal sector that has received scant attention before: the micro-politics of interest representation. I study this crucial issue for informal workers’ capacity to influence public policy at the market level, the central sphere of action of self-employed informal workers in retail commerce.
Leveraging original data from two original surveys administered to merchants and expert informants in 100 public and street markets in Mexico City, I analyse the three dimensions that structure informal interest representation systems: the number of organizations competing to represent the same constituency, the degree of inter- and intra-organizational competition, and membership density at the market level.
I make the point that, because of the particular combination of legal vacuum and socioeconomic marginalization experienced by informal workers, the organizational dynamics that govern their collective action differ from the predictions of both pluralist and corporatist theories.
First, differently from what happens in regulated arenas of organizational competition—such as formal sector interest representation—where monopolies grant the most power to collective actors, I show that competition between two informal sector organizations is most conducive to higher influence in the allocation of public resources across markets. Moderate competition in bi-organizational systems, where two organizations strive to represent the members of a market, makes them responsive enough to push for workers’ demands—unlike established monopolies—and powerful enough to see them through—unlike multi-organizational systems ridden with coordination problems.
Second, I show that intra-organizational competition shapes markets’ resource gathering capacity. Multiple leaderships within organizations in competitive systems lead to resource-consuming factional disputes, reducing the capacity to gather public resources, but make monopolistic organizations more responsive and thus more eager to demand resources.
Finally, concurring with theories of interest representation in formal settings, I show that higher levels of inter-organizational conflict make markets less able to secure resources due to the increased coordination problems and that higher levels of inter-organizational conflict make markets less able to secure resources due to the increased coordination problems.
I complement the econometric results with qualitative evidence based on over 50 interviews comprised of in-depth semi-structured interviews, short unstructured interviews, and participant observation in meetings, protests, and public demonstrations. This additional qualitative evidence allows me to illustrate the mechanisms working behind the relationship between organizational dynamics and resource extraction.

Author

• Federico Fuchs, London School of Economics