Choice of Binding: China’s Binding Strategies Toward North Korea, 1965-1971

• In Event: New Approaches to Studying Chinese Foreign Policy

Abstract

States use binding strategies to maintain or enhance their alliances. A binding strategy dynamic involves three actors: the state choosing binding strategies (the initiator), the target state who has a formal or informal alignment with the initiator, and the adversary. How does the initiator choose different types of binding strategies? This study argues that the combination of the initiator’s leverage over the target and the initiator’s fear of abandonment determines its choice.

When considering its binding strategies, the initiator worries about the risk of blowback. It is the risk that the initiator’s binding strategy pushes away rather than binds the target. Using coercive binding strategies means threat of force. The target that feels threatened has incentive to drift further away from the initiator. This risk of blowback is a function of the initiator’s leverage over the target. Leverage implies that the target depends on the initiator. The stronger the leverage, the higher such dependence. Therefore, the risk of blowback is lower. Meanwhile, the initiator’s strong leverage does not completely exclude the risk of blowback. To minimize such risk, the initiator will use accommodative binding strategies to complement its coercion. Accommodating the target can signal the initiator’s restraint with coercion: the initiator could have devoted more resources to punishing the target, but chooses not to do so.

When the initiator only has weak leverage over the target, the risk of blowback increases and the initiator is likely to refrain from using coercive binding strategy. As a result, the initiator needs to choose between accommodation and wait-and-see, a choice relying on its fear of abandonment. When such fear is strong, it means that the target is likely to desert the initiator and that desertion will pose a serious threat to the initiator’s security. Therefore, the initiator cannot afford doing nothing. Accommodation thus becomes the primary strategy for the initiator. Meanwhile, the initiator will use coercive binding strategies as its complementary strategy. A coercive binding strategy serves as a signal to the target: if the target does not stay within its alignment, the initiator will impose punishment on it.

This study tests the theory with China’s use of binding strategies toward North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. As an ally of both the Soviet Union and China, North Korea stood closer with the latter in the early 1960s. Brezhnev attempted to reverse the situation by increasing both economic and military assistance to North Korea. It worked as North Korea began to lean toward the Soviet Union. Alerted by this tendency, China used binding strategies to maintain North Korea’s loyalty.

North Korea’s geographic proximity with China provided China with strong leverage. As a result, the Chinese leaders worried less about the risk of blowback. On the contrary, binding strategies could rapidly raise the costs for North Korea to lean toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, China used coercive binding strategies toward North Korea. China not only reduced its trade and economic aid to North Korea, but also raised tension along the Chinese-North Korean border. Meanwhile, China complemented its coercive binding strategies with accommodative ones. On the one hand, China needed North Korea as a buffer zone against both the Soviet Union and the United States. It required China to help maintain North Korea’s defensive capabilities. On the other hand, North Korea’s realignment with the Soviet Union was limited. Therefore, China kept providing military aid to North Korea, although at a reduced level.

This study contributes to our understanding of binding strategies, an important tool of external balancing. Different from the existing literature, I argue that states often opt for mixed strategies rather than pure strategies. Moreover, this study also has policy implications. As China and Russia are trying to undermine the U.S. alliance system in East Asia and Europe, the United States uses binding strategies to maintain its alliances. Findings of this study helps understand U.S. strategic choices.

Author

• Chengzhi Yin, Boston College