Montesquieu’s Concern for the Inherent Danger of a State’s Despotism and His View on the Countervailing Forces Against State Violence and the Outbreak of Violent Conflict

• In Event: Economies of Violence in Modern Statecraft

Abstract

As Diana Schaub has shown, for Montesquieu, every form of government always carries with it the potential to become despotic. The separation of powers, of course, is an effort to tame this inherent danger. However, the separation of powers can take – and historically took – many different forms. It must not necessarily go on existing in the way we are used to, and this, for Montesquieu, must not necessarily be a loss. This depends on the outer circumstances and inner dynamics of a specific society, and its existing form of government. One thing we can be sure of is that, although it might look steady at one point, the political realm is always in motion. This truth has in recent years become more apparent to us again. In my talk, I want to map out different ways in which the despotic potential of the modern state can be moderated, thereby drawing on central insights from Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws. Additional focus will thereby be laid on the question of different property regimes throughout history, and past political measures for the avoidance of the concentration of property. Here, also James Madison’s reading of Montesquieu will become thematic.

Author

• Dirk Schuck, University of Erfurt