The Politics of Politically Connected Firms

Session Submission Type: Virtual Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Firms are increasingly acknowledged as political actors. Consequently, an increasing number of authors have turned towards disaggregated analyses focusing on the firm level, from the new-new-trade theory to the analysis of human rights in supply chains. This has been facilitated by an increasing availability of firm-level data. This panel brings together scholars who are interested in better understanding the relationship between firms and politicians. Specifically, the panel investigates how political connections provide firms with substantial benefits. For example, the papers examine how firm characteristics (e.g. size and productivity) are associated with lobbying, and how lobbying in turn shapes firm characteristics such as their success in particular markets. Finally, the panel also investigates how firms investment and trade patterns can create new political cleavages that become politically relevant. In short, we hope to shed light on firms' political behavior by unpacking the causes and effects of political connections to policy makers.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Politically Connected Ownership - Timm Betz, Technical University of Munich; Amy Pond, Technical University of Munich

• Why Trade and FDI Should Be Studied Together - In Song Kim, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Steven Liao, University of California, Riverside; Sayumi Miyano, Princeton University

• Lobbying in the European Union: A New Dataset at the Firm Level (Pre-Recorded) - Leonardo Baccini, McGill University; Andreas Duer, University of Salzburg

• EXIM Bank, Firms, and Congress - Jonas Bunte, Vienna University of Economics and Business

Chair

• Raphael Cunha Florida State University

Discussant

• Seungjun Kim University of California, Merced