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Compliance and Defiance with International Commitments

Sun, October 3, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Scholars of international cooperation have devoted considerable attention to examining how and why states comply with international commitments. Much of this literature argues that states comply in order to avoid the material, reputational, or domestic political consequences associated with violating international rules. The papers in this panel analyze these processes in light of recent shifts in the international political environment. How do the rise of domestic populist movements, the fragmentation of global governance bodies, and innovations in institutional design affect the incentives for states to comply?

The papers in this panel analyze compliance in the issue areas of human rights, climate change, and trade. Morse examines the 2016 Paris Agreement to consider how its unique institutional features shape the incentives for states to reduce carbon emissions. Contributions by Powers and Zvogbo & Simmons analyze domestic public support for international institutions (governing trade and war crimes, respectively) as they attempt to monitor and enforce commitments. Pratt explores the growing incoherence of international rules and its effect on the reputational consequences of non-compliance. Together, these papers suggest that the relationship between international rules and compliance is more complex than previously theorized, and they offer important new insights for moving the compliance research agenda forward.

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